by Miceál O’Hurley
TEHRAN ― Elected after a run-off election to determine the successor to Ebrahim Raisi following his untimely death in an accidental helicopter crash in May, the agenda of President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian has remained uncertain. In message authored by Pezeshkian and published in the Tehran Times on 12 July, he offered broad-stroke assertions pertaining to far-ranging issues. His attempt to project meaning to shape the world view of his Presidency has been met with varying degrees of acceptance, suspicion or rejection, depending on who opines. It is worth reading.
Before addressing Pezeshkian’s message it is worthwhile to consider his election and how the media and unceasing cadre of self-proclaimed “Iran experts” have characterised him. The disparate portrayals of the man and his agenda surely called Pezeshkian to attempt to seek to control his own image and define his agenda. Given the perception of Iran in varying quarters of the world it remains to be seen how effective he can be in shaping how the world sees him. In the final analysis, it is Carl Jung’s proposition, “You are what you do, not what you say you’ll do” that will ultimately define or redefine the world’s perception of Pezeshkian, his Presidency and quite possibly, Iran.
Anti-Iran regimes ‘experts and publications’ were quick to point out that Pezeshkian was an approved candidate of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. The implication is that any hopes for change in a system where policy, both domestic and international, rises and falls with the Supreme Leader, are unreasonable and misplaced. They may be right. Pezeshkian is not known to have himself proclaimed to be a reformer nor has he been known to have been a member of any “reform” parties. He has been a staunch and vocal proponent of the regime even praising the Islamic Republican Guard Corps’ Quds Force commander Qaesem Soleimani.
From such information it is hard to reconcile certain “experts” declarations that Pezeshkian is a “reformer”. A reading of his published “message” as it appeared in the Tehran Times equally makes it hard to declare that Pezeshkian is a “hard-liner”. Countries with a tradition of fundamentalist Islamic politics cannot and should not be viewed by the prism of pluralistic democracies were the political spectrum allows for some measure of quantification by left, centre or right leaning politics and agendas. The Islamic Republic of Iran is intent on preserving its political, social and maturing nature as not only an Islamic Republic, but The Islamic Republic notwithstanding external judgments of liberalism or conservatism.
Consequently, it would be imprudent for the West and its abundant supply of Iran experts to refrain from trying to fit Iran into their box and rather take a close but open view of Pezeshkian and his actions and measure what, in practice, they might mean for Iran its is role on the world stage. And, whether the West wants to admit it or not, or complain of the means by which Iran has obtained and sustains its stature, Iran is playing an oversized role on the world stage and that is unlikely to change any time soon.
Pezeshkian wouldn’t be the first person to find his world view changed by the assumption of high office to which they end-up governing from a vantage markedly different from that they once imagined or was expected of them. However, illiberal governments rarely allow for the type of independence necessary for such a sea change that would accommodate policy change in a way that significantly alters a nation’s course or standing overnight in the world community. It is unlikely that Iran’s history or religious and political structures allows for such a possibility to come to fruition even if this is Pezeshkian’s desire or possibly the ‘silent majority’s’ will. Power of the type necessary to enact sweeping policy changes of this type are simply not vested in Iran’s Presidency. Therefore, it is likely that any changes of Pezeshkian’s design, projected upon him or articulated by him, would only come to fruition given the top-down leadership of Iran’s political and spiritual architecture. There is little if any indication that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei desires to accommodate such a pivot.
Iran’s relations with Europe have known its ups and downs. After the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) in May 2018, European countries made eleven commitments to Iran to try to salvage the agreement and mitigate the impact of the United States’ unlawful and unilateral sanctions on our economy. These commitments involved ensuring effective banking transactions, effective protection of companies from U.S. sanctions, and the promotion of investments in Iran. European countries have reneged on all these commitments, yet unreasonably expect Iran to unilaterally fulfill all its obligations under the JCPOA. Despite these missteps, I look forward to engaging in constructive dialogue with European countries to set our relations on the right path, based on principles of mutual respect and equal footing. European countries should realize that Iranians are a proud people whose rights and dignity can no longer be overlooked. There are numerous areas of cooperation that Iran and Europe can explore once European powers come to terms with this reality and set aside self-arrogated moral supremacy coupled with manufactured crises that have plagued our relations for so long. Opportunities for collaboration include economic and technological cooperation, energy security, transit routes, environment, as well as combating terrorism and drug trafficking, refugee crises, and other fields, all of which could be pursued to the benefit of our nations. - Message of Masoud Pezeshkian, President-Elect, Islamic Republic of Iran
However, with the West having squandered the opportunity to somewhat normalise relations with Iran by rejecting the JCPOA that Iran was verified to have been faithfully implementing, the ability to influence Iran by engagement evaporated as a direct consequence of then President Donald Trump destroying the promise the JCPOA offered. Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and his coercion of Europe to follow in his footsteps will, no doubt, be recorded as one of the centuries greatest diplomatic and policy blunders. With Trump’s increasingly likely return to the U.S. Presidency it is unlikely that any reciprocity of good will offered by Pezeshkian in terms of a genuinely open dialogue will be embraced in the near-term. It may therefore be incumbent upon Pezeshkian to demonstrate fidelity to his overtures by demonstrative action before the West warms to Pezeshkian and re-considers its position.
It is likely, however, that historic skepticism from the West may continue to blind it to opportunities to engage in matters where cooperation might be possible without either destroying their commitment to their core and domestic values. Relations between Iran and the West have become so toxic that both sides may have to be committed to a long-term process of confidence building before a ‘Persian Ostpolotik’ becomes possible. Given the ages of presumptive American Presidential candidate Trump’s return to office and that of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei the duration necessary for such a development to come to fruition may be interrupted by more change which will undoubtedly introduce more uncertainty and complicate durable trust.
I ran for office on a platform of reform, fostering national unity, and constructive engagement with the world, ultimately earning the trust of my compatriots at the ballot box, including those young women and men dissatisfied with the overall state of affairs. I deeply value their trust and am fully committed to cultivating consensus, both domestically and internationally, to uphold the promises I made during my campaign. - Message of Masoud Pezeshkian, President-Elect, Islamic Republic of Iran
As for Pezeshkian’s ‘message’ as published in the Tehran Times? His assertion that Iran’s political system is marked by “remarkable stability by conducting elections in a competitive, peaceful and orderly manner” must be contrasted with the ability for dissenters and opponents of the regime to be included on the ballot. It is unsurprising that Iran experienced one of the lowest voter participation rates in its history given the lack of diversity on the electoral slate. Still, the election had the hallmarks of a generally fair election free of transactional corruption. Indeed, in a perverse way the greatest sign of the government’s stability may be marked by the freedom of the electorate to demonstrate their unhappiness through their lackluster participation in the elections. It seems just as in America, Britain, France, Germany and elsewhere in the Western world, Iranians too feel free to demonstrate their unhappiness with their political elite and limited choices dictated by the rich and powerful with their choices by simply staying away from the ballot box.
For differing reasons, both liberal and illiberal democracies are currently struggling with how to engage the electorate when their top-down selection of candidates limit the voices of the hoi polloi who increasingly complain of alienation and disenfranchisement. Should the trend continue it may seem to some that revolution is the only means of genuine reform. Increased political unrest in the West and places like Iran require their governments to reconsider how to address growing political dissatisfaction before the ballot box is abandoned for physical action to change governments and institutions. This is as much a risk for the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia and elsewhere as it is for Iran. While regimes like Iran and to a lesser extent illiberal democracies in Europe have a tendency to resort to censorship and physical force which over time have historically proven futile and inevitably lead to the very change they sought to stem, more liberal democracies have struggled to offer any real change to stymie the trend of diminished trust in politicians and institutions over the past two decades.
Governments across the globe are suffering from public confidence in their historic institutions and elected leadership. Albeit, Iran’s history of heavy-handed oppression of dissenting voices, including women who protest by refusing to wear what their ‘morality police’ deem to be appropriate head coverings in public, and the suppression of alternative news sources not subject to stringent Government restrictions, indicates that Iran’s issues with satisfying its public goes far beyond having a limited or even poor choice of candidates and strikes at the core of human values. In essence, Iran is confronting the same issues as Western democracies do – the clash between personal expression and liberty and the will of their governments to shape society, including religious expression and political activity while retaining power over a populace suspect of their goals and policies.
Kezeshkian’s claim of having run on a “platform of reform” doesn’t make him a reformer. The two aren’t necessarily synonymous. After all, Nikita Khruschev promoted a platform of “reform” as a departure from the Stalinist era but he has never been considered to have had any interest in displacing Communism as the unifying and organising ethos of the Soviet Union. Too often in the West the idea that “reform” means a change of regimes or radical change in policy is seriously misplaced. Reform in Iran is more likely to be envisioned as changes to reinforce the nation’s commitment to its revolutionary foundations and not embrace Western, liberal, democratic political aspirations and cultural norms.
Still, the West must be open to Kezeshkian’s pledge to seek “constructive engagement with the world” even if a “trust but verify” posture is adopted. Iran’s economy is in shambles. Enduring sanctions that defeat even the humanitarian “loopholes” that should in theory allow the Iranian people to access medicines and other humanitarian items do not work and the suffering of the innocents grows. Children and other sick persons are denied basic medical care that would prove life-saving simply because Iran can engage with the world banking system to buy medical devices and medicines that are approved for their purchase. Iranians have died on airline flights suffering catastrophic mechanical failure because they cannot acquire spare parts to maintain their civilian airline fleets. It is not lost on me that Kezeshkian may only be President today due to the West’s sanctions that deprived Iran of properly maintaining their President’s helicopter, an aircraft whose age would have reduced it to being part of a museum display in most parts of the world. Many of the sanctions the West believed would induce regime change or policy shifts of significant merit have failed making them merely cruel and oppressive to the average Iranian.
It will be interesting to see how Pezeshkian intends to achieve this while preserving what he calls “Iran’s national dignity… under all circumstances”. If the West is genuine in its desire to reduce regional and international conflict it may have to reconsider its disengagement policy with Iran and look for opportunities, large and small, even transactional, to find cooperation without compromising essential values on either side.
The real watchword from Pezeshkian was his articulation of pursuing a “opportunity driven policy”. For too long Iran and its opponents have been engaged in a dance in which each insists it knows the steps while the band plays a tune of its own choosing. All engagement with Iran is attended to by each side’s ‘red lines’ which often defy a mutuality of interest even where a divergence of ideologies endures. Even the staunch anti-Communist Winston Churchill found it necessary and beneficial to work closely with Josef Stalin to preserve Western culture from Nazism. The tragedy that daily unfolds in Gaza is an example of Iran and the West sharing mutual (though not absolutely aligned) goals of putting a stop to the bloodshed in Gaza and yet cooperation defeats the moment. Regional stability is the key to the economic prosperity of all regional actors and is as much in the West’s political interests as it is Iran’s to put an end to the carnage suffered by the Palestinian people. Cooperation in reducing and stopping the un-holy violence in Gaza presents Pezeshkian with such an “opportunity” to develop a new policy of political engagement and in this instance consider an alternative to the asymmetrical threat of increased violence that has increased Iran’s regional stature but not solved any problems to date.
Indeed, the plight of the Palestinian people and growing intransigence of Israel’s ruling Likud-coalition that seems more intent on power preservation than constructive leadership and attainable military goals (even to former Israeli Prime Ministers and opposition party leaders) now presents Iran with an opportunity to reach across past divides and build new relationships, no matter how fragile, with other regional power players including Tůrkiye, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, the Emirates. An enduring cessation of hostilities is everyone’s prayer and in truth, requires the active participation of each player, and yet the gauntlet remains on the ground. The situation in Gaza undoubtedly could be transformed into an entrée to constructive dialogue and engagement with regional organisations to address issues of mutual concern such as promoting economic ties and moving towards acceptance if not normalisation with those who have been historic opponents. It is as incumbent upon Pezeshkian to put actions to his work as it is for regional players and the West to recognise the opportunities that arise and be open to engagement where possible.
There is no escaping, however, Iran’s continued support for militias that threaten their neighbours. Nor can Iran’s historic and close collaboration and ties with China and Russia. Notwithstanding the lifeline that BRICS has offered Russia, it will continue to decline in economic strength and political influence given its debacle in invading Ukraine and the resulting slippage into dependency on China. Iran’s relationship with China, which has been long and fruitful for each, will undoubtedly remain powerful and enduring. The extent to which Pezeshkian can negotiate any improved engagement with regional partners while it maintains support for threatening militias and develop a working rapport with the West while it relies on belligerence and threat to wield power will depend on his ability to maintain to balance his relations with Chine while improving his relationships elsewhere. While Iran and share relationships with China of varying degrees the difference is that they do so as a matter of benefit and convenience while Iran’s relationship with China is one of existential necessity. Should Pezeshkian be able to avoid antagonising China and forging better relationships with the wider world Iran’s necessity of relying on brute force and the threat of it within the region and the wider world will likely diminish in direct proportion.
To be certain, Kezeshkian may genuinely want to improve relations with the West and engage with it more fruitfully. However, while beneficial, such is not essential for Iran. Iran could remain content to continue their success in building enhanced, beneficial relations with the ‘Global South’ and South America, regions in which the West often falters. With the recent growth and strengthening of BRICS, and given Iran’s strong relationship with China, a increasingly functional bond with Saudia Arabia and other partners, all which have grown beyond expectations. Coupled with the receptive audience of the ‘Global South’ and South America, Pezeshkian is likely to “scratch where it itches” and find relief by plowing already fertile soil outside of the West’s central sphere of focus and interests.
For now, Pezeshkian has his work cut out for him. The West may realise, much to its chagrin and distaste, that where it can work collaboratively with Iran to achieve accord on issue of mutual interests, it must do so. Pezeshkian will have to make good on his allusions of willingness to engage constructively. It remains to be seen if Iran’s political and religious architecture would allow for such changes in policy. The West should watch and see if Pezeshkian can deliver and if Iran can moderate the threat posed by its regional influence with militias capable of disrupting affairs economic and political.
As much as this is a large task for Pezeshkian to address it may prove equally difficult for the West to engage without resort to the pressure tactics and demand for regime change previously demanded by Trump and his advisors like John Bolton who believed it would do away with Iran’s Islamic Republic. It didn’t. However, the likelihood of Trump’s return to power, his vocalised promise of “retribution” and ignorance between the difference of a diplomatic scalpel and hammer along with Europe’s trend towards isolationism, conservatism and right-wing activism only portends for more chaos.
For now, Pezeshkian has laid out his hopes and vision for Iran. It remains to be seen if he can deliver and if the West has the good sense to engage, when and where it can, if he does,
